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1/13/10
Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations
By Bennett L. Gershman
Introduction – Imbler v. Pachtman 34 Years After
For those of us who teach and write about the conduct of prosecutors, reading
Imbler v. Pachtman 1 34 years after is a profoundly disturbing experience. Imbler is the
linchpin for the doctrine that affords prosecutors absolute immunity from civil liability
for actions that violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. Despite its revisionist history
and dubious policy, Imbler is one of the Supreme Court’s most durable precedents,
having been reaffirmed several times, 2 and as recently as last Term. 3 The Court in
Imbler viewed the prosecutor as a “quasi-judicial” official, much like a judge or a grand
juror, for whom absolute immunity is vital to protect the judicial process from harassment
and intimidation. 4 Thus, according to Imbler, when a prosecutor initiates a prosecution
and pursues a criminal case, the prosecutor is cloaked with absolute immunity from civil
liability to allow the prosecutor to make discretionary decisions fairly and fearlessly

1

424 U.S. 409 (1976).
See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)(prosecutor protected by absolute immunity for preparing and
filing charging documents but not entitled to absolute immunity for execution of certification for
determination of probable cause); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993)(prosecutor not entitled to
absolute immunity in investigating whether boot print at scene of crime was left by suspect and not entitled
to absolute immunity for allegedly false statements made during press conference); Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478 (1991)(prosecutor absolutely immune for participation in probable cause hearing but not entitled
to absolute immunity for giving legal advice to police).
3
See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009)(absolute immunity applies to administrative
functions of District Attorney and chief supervisory prosecutor for allegedly failing to institute supervision
and training programs for assistants). See also Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, 547 F.3d 922 (8th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009)(Court hears oral arguments on whether prosecutors who
allegedly procured false testimony from witnesses during murder investigation and introduced false
testimony at trial that resulted in defendants wrongful convictions and incarceration for nearly 20 years are
entitled to absolute immunity), cert. dismissed, 2010 WL 6917 (Mem.) U.S. 2010. See Warren Richey,
Supreme Court Drops Key Case on Limits of Immunity for Prosecutors, Christian Science Monitor, January
4, 2010 (parties agree to end case in $12 million settlement).
4
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423-429.
2

1

without the distraction of a flood of civil lawsuits by disgruntled and resentful
defendants. 5 The Court acknowledged the hard choice between the evils inherent in either
alternative but, quoting Judge Learned Hand, concluded that it is “in the end better to
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to
do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.” 6
As an open question 34 years ago, Imbler’s choice to afford prosecutors absolute
immunity for advocacy functions was not entirely unreasonable. Although the Court had
to invent a specially-tailored common law history for absolute immunity, and had to
concoct a public policy to spare prosecutors from having to defend civil lawsuits,
Imbler’s accommodation is not without justification contextually. Civil rights litigation
thirty-four years ago was much less hospitable to prosecutors; qualified immunity was
not nearly as protective of prosecutors as it is today. 7 Moreover, alternative sanctions for
misconduct, such as criminal prosecution and professional discipline, were not clearly
unavailable or ineffective; the Court was making an educated guess that these checks
might serve as an effective deterrent to misconduct. 8 Further, the Court’s attempt to
classify a prosecutor’s conduct into functional categories such as advocacy, investigation,
and administration, while not seamless and easily applied, seemed rational, and in any
event, as the Court acknowledged, may present close questions requiring line-drawing in
future cases. 9 Most importantly, however, the Court did not discuss the larger problem of
prosecutorial misconduct, particularly as it relates to the prosecutor’s duty to disclose

5

Id. at 423-426.
Id. at 428, quoting Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926)(L. Hand, J.).
7
See infra notes 185-190, and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 152-184, and accompanying text.
9
See 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33.
6

2

exculpatory evidence; the subject was not nearly as complex and controversial as it is
today. 10
Thus, as the edifice for the doctrine that has spawned hundreds of decisions
immunizing prosecutors from civil liability for acts of willful misconduct – misconduct
that occasionally resulted in innocent defendants being convicted and punished 11 –
Imbler appears in retrospect to have been a gratuitous experiment in judicial
administration that not only failed to protect the judicial process but in fact skewed the
balance of power in the criminal justice system more heavily toward prosecutors. 12
Moreover, by removing a deterrent to abuse of power by prosecutors, Imbler encouraged
dishonest prosecutors to hit below the belt, and discouraged honest prosecutors from
doing the right thing. Although Imbler’s perverse analysis of incentives and disincentives
applies to the conduct of prosecutors across the board, there is one area of prosecutorial
misconduct in which Imbler’s adoption of absolute immunity for prosecutors applies with
special force -- the prosecutor’s decision to conceal from a defendant exculpatory
evidence that in some cases could be used to prove the defendant’s innocence. That is
the subject of this Article: whether prosecutors should enjoy absolute immunity from
civil liability for deliberately suppressing exculpatory evidence, or whether the Supreme
Court, or Congress, should create an exception to absolute immunity for the deliberate
suppression of exculpatory evidence.

10

See infra Part III.
See infra note 137, and accompanying text.
12
Several commentators have proposed abolishing absolute prosecutorial immunity entirely. See Malia N.
Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity,
4 CHAR. L. REV. 1 (2009); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005
B.Y.U.L. REV. 53 (2005); Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135 (1996).
11

3

Part I of this Article discusses Imbler’s adoption of absolute immunity for
prosecutors. Part II discusses Imbler’s extentsion of absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s
violation of his disclosure duty under Brady v. Maryland. 13 Part III describes the ease
with which prosecutors are able to evade the Brady rule and the difficulty of enforcing
compliance with Brady. Part IV discusses the absence of any meaningful sanctions to
deter and punish prosecutors for willful violations of Brady. Part V proposes a bad faith
exception to absolute immunity of prosecutors for Brady violations.

I. Imbler’s Adoption of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
Paul Imbler was convicted in 1961 of robbing and murdering Morris Hasson, the
operator of a market in Los Angeles, California, and was sentenced to death. 14 The
prosecution’s key witness was Alfred Costello, who positively identified Imbler as the
gunman. 15 Imbler raised an alibi defense. 16 After the state supreme court affirmed the
conviction and sentence, the trial prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard
Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California describing new witnesses who
corroborated Imbler’s alibi as well as new evidence that undermined Costello’s
credibility. 17 Imbler thereupon filed a state habeas corpus petition based on this new

13

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 411-412. An alleged accomplice in the Hasson killing, Leonard Lingo, was himself
killed ten days later while attempting a robbery in Pomona, California. A subsequent investigation led by
the Los Angeles District Attorney determined that Lingo was involved in the Hassson killing and that
Imbler killed Hasson.
15
Id. at 412. The prosecution also introduced several other eyewitnesses whose testimony supported
Costello.
16
Id. Imbler claimed to have spent the night of the killing bar-hopping with several persons and that he met
Lingo for the first time the morning before the Pomona robbery. A witness corroborated his alibi.
17
Id. Pachtman’s letter described newly discovered corroborating witnesses for Imbler’s alibi as well as
new revelations about Costello’s background which indicated he was less trustworthy than he had
represented originally to Pachtman and in his testimony. The letter was dated August 17, 1962. Imbler’s
execution, which was originally scheduled for September 12, 1962, was stayed.
14

4

evidence but after a hearing, the writ was denied, 18 although for unrelated reasons,
Imbler’s death sentence was overturned. 19 A few years later Imbler filed a federal habeas
corpus petition raising the same grounds that were rejected by the state court. 20 Deciding
the petition on the written record without holding a hearing, the federal district court
found eight instances of misconduct at Imbler’s trial whose cumulative effect warranted
issuance of the writ. 21
According to the district court, the misconduct consisted of six instances during
Costello’s testimony in which the prosecutor elicited false and misleading testimony from
Costello about his criminal background, his education, and his current income. 22
Although Pachtman lacked actual knowledge of the falsity, according to the district court,
he had “cause to suspect” it. 23 The other two instances of misconduct were suppressions
of evidence by a police fingerprint expert who testified at the trial, 24 and by a police
investigator who had altered an artist’s sketch to resemble Imbler more closely. 25 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 26 finding that the district court had merely

18

Id. at 413. A referee was appointed to conduct the hearing at which Costello was the “main attraction.”
He recanted his trial identification of Imbler and admitted embellishing his background during his trial
testimony. The corroborating witnesses uncovered by Pachtman also testified. Imbler’s counsel described
Pachtman’s post-trial investigation as “in the highest tradition of law enforcement and justice” and a
premier example of “devotion to duty.” But he also charged that Pachtman had knowingly used Costello’s
false testimony at Imbler’s trial. In a thorough opinion by Justice Roger Traynor, the California Supreme
Court unanimously rejected these contentions and denied the writ. See In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1963).
The California court agreed with the referee’s finding that Costello’s recantation lacked credibility
compared to his original identification, and that the new corroborating witnesses who testified at the
hearing were unreliable. Id. at 10-14.
19
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 414.
20
Id.
21
See Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (C.D.Cal. 1969).
22
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415 n. 8 (referring to district court’s finding that Costello had “lied flatly” about his
criminal record, education, and current income).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 415.
25
Id.
26
Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1970).

5

reached different conclusions than the state court in applying federal constitutional
standards to the facts. The state chose not to retry Imbler and he was released. 27
Imbler thereafter filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Pachtman and various officers of the Los Angeles police department alleging a
conspiracy to deprive him of his liberty in violation of due process. 28 Imbler’s complaint
essentially tracked the district court’s opinion in alleging that Pachtman, intentionally and
negligently, allowed Costello to give false testimony; that Pachtman was chargeable with
the fingerprint expert’s suppression; that Pachtman knew that a lie detector test had
cleared Imbler; and that Pachtman had used at trial the altered artist’s sketch. 29 The
district court granted Pachtman’s motion to dismiss the complaint, 30 holding that public
prosecutors repeatedly had been afforded immunity from civil liability for “acts done as
part of their traditional official functions.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, finding that Pachtman’s acts were committed during prosecutorial activities that
were “an integral part of the judicial process.” 31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the “important and recurring
issue” of prosecutorial liability under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 32 The Court
acknowledged at the outset that Section 1983, the statutory remedy for the deprivation of
constitutional rights caused by an official’s abuse of power, 33 contains no immunities for

27

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415.
Id. at 415-416.
29
Id. at 416.
30
Id.
31
Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974), quoting Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th
Cir. 1968).
32
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417.
33
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1971, states:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
28
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prosecutors. 34 However, the Supreme Court assumed that Congress did not intend to
abrogate all of the immunities that existed at common law, and the Court identified those
immunities that were available for certain parties at common law. 35 Thus, according to
the Court, absolute immunity was available at common law for judges, 36 legislators, 37
grand jurors, 38 and other government officials such as assessors, highway officers, and
members of township boards. 39 In addition, absolute immunity, referred to as
“defamation immunity,” also was available to any person for statements that were made
in the course of judicial proceedings. 40 However, absolute immunity was not afforded to
other government officials, only a qualified immunity, referred to at common law as

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
34
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417. Indeed, in 1871, when Section 1983 was enacted, public prosecutors did not
exist in their modern form and criminal prosecutions ordinarily were instituted by private citizens.. See
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring)(noting that at common law private citizens
typically performed the functions currently delegated to public prosecutors); Burns v. Reed 500 U.S. at 500
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting)(noting that “prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern
form in 1871, would have been considered quasi-judicial”). It was 25 years later that a state court would
address for the first time a prosecutor’s immunity from civil liability. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001
(Ind. 1896)(holding prosecutor absolutely immune in civil action alleging that prosecutor maliciously and
without probable cause added plaintiff’s name to grand jury true bill after grand jury refused to indict
plaintiff and which resulted in plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration).
35
Imbler , 424 U.S. at 417-419. The Court cited Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951), for the
conclusion that immunities “well grounded in history and reason” had not been abrogated “by covert
inclusion in the general language” of section 1983.
36
Id. at 418, 423 n. 20 (“The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the
earliest days of the common law.”).
37
Id. at 418, noting that “regardless of any unworthy purpose animating their actions, legislators were held
to enjoy under this statute their usual immunity when acting ‘in a field where legislators traditionally have
power to act,’” quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 379.
38
Id. at 423 n. 20 (noting that the immunity of grand jurors enjoys “an almost equally venerable common
law tenet” as judges).
39
For discussion of these immunities, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, “prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern form in
1871, would have been considered quasi-judicial (wherefore they are entitled to qualified immunity under §
1983).” Id. (emphasis in original).
40
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n. 23 (“In the law of defamation, a concern for the airing of all evidence has
resulted in an absolute privilege for any courtroom statement relevant to the subject matter of the
proceeding. In the case of lawyers the privilege extends to their briefs and pleadings as well.”).

7

“quasi-judicial immunity.” 41 Qualified immunity was available to government officials
such as governors, 42 other executive branch officials, 43 and police officers. 44
With respect to a prosecutor’s immunity at common law, Imbler concluded, as
had several lower courts, that it is “well settled” that a prosecutor enjoyed absolute
immunity when he acted within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. 45 To be sure,
prosecutors are members of the executive branch, and as the Court noted, executive
branch officials such as governors and police officers at common law received only
qualified immunity. 46 Moreover, Imbler referred to a prosecutor as a “quasi-judicial”
official, and at common law, absolute immunity was not available to quasi-judicial
officials. 47 Nonetheless, Imbler emphasized the prosecutor’s “functional comparability”
to judges and grand jurors to the extent that all of these parties make discretionary
decisions on the basis of evidence presented to them in court. 48 Thus, despite some
analytical gaps and inconsistencies, Imbler was able to extrapolate from the common law
two broad categories in which absolute immunity for prosecutors would be available;

41

Id. at 420, 423 n. 20 (referring to grand jurors and prosecutors as “quasi-judicial” officers); Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. at 500 (noting that quasi-judicial immunity afforded an official only qualified
immunity)(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 132 (noting that at
common law, the discretionary decisions of public officials that did not involve actual adjudication were
protected by “quasi-judicial” immunity, and is “more akin to what we now call ‘qualified,’ rather than
absolute immunity”)(Scalia, J., concurring).
42
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
43
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247.
44
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-557 (1967).
45
Id. at 424, 424 n. 21 (citing cases)..
46
Id. at 418-419.
47
See supra note 41, and accompanying text.
48
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20. (“Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have
sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials judge, grand juror, and prosecutor exercise a
discretionary judgment on the basis of the evidence presented to them…It is the functional comparability of
their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to
as ‘quasi-judicial’ officers, and their immunities being termed ‘quasi-judicial’ as well.”).”

8

first, suits for malicious prosecution, 49 and second, suits alleging courtroom misconduct
that involves the examination of witnesses and arguments to the jury. 50
Imbler, however, extended a prosecutor’s absolute immunity beyond these two
categories. Relying on public policy, Imbler reasoned that if a prosecutor was constrained
in making “every decision” by the threat of a civil lawsuit, the public trust in the
prosecutor’s office might be compromised. 51 Imbler speculated that lawsuits against
prosecutors could be expected “with some frequency,” 52 and that the prosecutor’s energy
and attention to his work as a consequence would be diverted. 53 Imbler further argued,
but did not elaborate, that affording prosecutors only qualified immunity would have an
adverse effect on the criminal justice system because a prosecutor would face “greater
difficulty” in meeting the standard of qualified immunity than other executive or
administrative officials. 54 Moreover, according to Imbler, a prosecutor might be
discouraged from presenting evidence whose accuracy might be questionable, or making
arguments about that evidence, if the use of and arguments about that evidence exposed
him to personal liability. 55 In sum, according to Imbler, “the ultimate fairness of the

49

Id. at 422-424.
Id. at 426 n. 23.
51
Id. at 424-425 (“A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to
bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were
constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit
for damages.”).
52
Id. at 425.
53
Id. (“if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with
wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal
law”).
54
Id. (“It is fair to say, we think, that the honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty in meeting the
standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials.”). The Court noted that
prosecutors operate under “serious constraints of time and even information,” but did not explain why other
executive and administrative officials who receive qualified immunity but who operate under similar
constraints would not face the same burdens as prosecutors).
55
Id. at 426 (noting that veracity of witnesses in criminal cases “frequently is subject to doubt,” and “[i]f
prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about
resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence”).
50

9

operation of the system itself would be weakened by subjecting prosecutors to §1983
liability.” 56
Although Imbler recognized that a genuinely wronged defendant would be
without a civil remedy against a malicious and dishonest prosecutor, Imbler believed that
the alternative would disserve the broader public interest. 57 In fact, Imbler surmised that a
defendant might actually be prejudiced if he was able to pursue a § 1983 lawsuit against a
prosecutor because a court that reviewed the prosecutor’s conduct might skew its
decision to protect the prosecutor from potential civil liability. 58 Moreover, Imbler
asserted, alternative sanctions to civil lawsuits against prosecutors were available to deter
a prosecutor’s malicious and dishonest behavior. Indeed, the availability of bringing
criminal charges against a prosecutor, 59 as well as the availability of professional
discipline by bar associations, 60 would “not leave the public powerless.” 61 “These
checks,” said the Court, “undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is
the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons
accused of crime.” 62
The scope of the absolute immunity that Imbler afforded prosecutors was not
demarcated precisely. Imbler used various formulations to describe the extent of a
prosecutor’s immunity, stating that absolute immunity would be available for prosecutors

56

Id. at 427.
See supra note 6, and accompanying text.
58
Id. at 428 (qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity “often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by
skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice”);
and 428 n. 27 (“consideration of the habeas petition could well be colored by an awareness of potential
prosecutorial liability”).
59
Id. at 429.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
57
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in “initiating a prosecution,” 63 “presenting the state’s case,” 64 performing activities that
are “an integral part of the judicial process,” 65 performing activities that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,”66 and performing functions as
an “advocate,” 67 although noting that an advocate’s duties may also include actions
preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution as well as actions outside the courtroom. 68
Imbler cautioned that absolute immunity would not necessarily be afforded to prosecutors
for administrative and investigative activities, and concluded that “[d]rawing a proper
line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not
require us to anticipate them.” 69

II. Imbler’s Application to Brady Violations
Imbler did not explicitly address whether absolute immunity extends to a
prosecutor who violates his constitutional duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence
to a defendant under Brady v. Maryland. 70 Imbler’s lawsuit against Pachtman was based
almost entirely on allegations that Pachtman knowingly allowed a key eyewitness at
63

Id. at 431; Id. at 421
Id. at 431.
65
Id. at 430, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d at 1302
66
Id. at 430.
67
Id. at 431; Id. at 431 n. 33.
68
Id. at 431 n. 33.
69
Id. The Supreme Court has not decided whether absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor’s postconviction functions, such as prosecuting an appeal, opposing habeas petitions, or reviewing newly
discovered evidence. Circuit Courts of Appeal have reached different conclusions. Compare Warney v.
Monroe County, 587 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2009)(prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity for post-conviction
review and testing of DNA evidence), and Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1994)(absolute immunity
for handling direct appeal and post-conviction motions) with Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129
(3d Cir. 2006)(no absolute immunity unless prosecutor personally involved as state’s advocate in postconviction proceedings) and Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992)(no absolute immunity where
prosecutor did not personally prosecute appeal). For a discussion on prosecutorial conduct in the postconviction context, see Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U.L. REV. 125 (2004)(explaining prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction
claims of innocence as attributable to personal incentives to maintaining convictions, logistical barriers to
confronting innocence claims, and political consequences in responding to such claims).
70
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
64

11

Imbler’s capital murder trial to testify falsely without correcting that testimony. 71 Imbler
included counts charging suppression of evidence by the police, and claimed that
Pachtman was responsible for that suppression vicariously. 72 The Supreme Court
discussed Imbler’s Brady claim in a lengthy footnote at the end of its opinion largely in
response to Justice White’s concurring opinion in which he argued against extending
absolute immunity to Brady violations. 73
In his concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, did not disagree that absolute immunity would be appropriate when a
prosecutor is sued civilly for knowingly eliciting and using false testimony to prove a
defendant’s guilt. Justice White drew this conclusion based on his understanding that a
prosecutor’s absolute immunity at common law extended to two kinds of lawsuits – suits
for malicious prosecution, 74 and suits for defamatory remarks made during judicial
proceedings. 75 As to the immunity for malicious prosecution, Justice White observed that
this immunity was necessary to protect the judicial process because absent immunity,
prosecutors might be afraid to bring proper charges against a defendant for fear of being
sued if the defendant was acquitted. 76 As to the immunity for statements made in court,
Justice White observed that this immunity was also necessary to protect the judicial
process by encouraging those persons involved in judicial proceedings to make complete

71

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416.
Id.
73
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34.
74
Id. at 438 (“I agree with the majority that, with respect to suits based on claims that the prosecutor’s
decision was malicious, and without probable cause…the judicial process is better served by absolute
immunity than by any other rule.”).
75
Id. at 440 (noting that function of judicial proceeding is “to determine where the truth lies,” and those
parties involved in judicial proceedings should be encouraged to make full disclosure of all relevant
information).
76
Id. at 438 (“If suits for malicious prosecution were permitted, the prosecutor’s incentive would always be
not to bring charges.”).
72
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and candid disclosures of all relevant information without fear of being sued for false and
defamatory testimony and arguments. 77 Indeed, Justice White observed, it is precisely the
function of a judicial proceeding to determine the truth, and since it is often impossible
for attorneys to be absolutely certain of objective truth and falsity, a prosecutor should be
given every incentive to submit the testimony of witnesses to the crucible of the judicial
process without being subjected to liability based on the claim that he knew or should
have known that the testimony of the witness was false. 78
However, according to Justice White, the majority extended to prosecutors an
immunity that was not available at common law -- immunity for the suppression of
exculpatory evidence. 79 Rather than protecting the judicial process, according to Justice
White, affording a prosecutor absolute immunity for such conduct in fact undermines the
judicial process by removing an incentive to prosecutors to disclose material evidence
that is favorable to the defendant. 80 Accusing the majority of an illogical extension of
immunity, Justice White explained that whereas it is sensible to afford defamation
immunity to prosecutors to encourage prosecutors to elicit all relevant information to
assist the fact-finder in arriving at the truth, “it would stand this immunity rule on its
head” to apply it to a prosecutor who withholds relevant information from the fact-finder
and thereby prevents the fact-finder from arriving at the truth. 81 Thus, according to

77

Id. at 439.
Id. at 440 (“I agree with the majority that history and policy support an absolute immunity for
prosecutors from suits based solely on claims that they knew or should have known that the testimony of a
witness called by the prosecution was false.”). Justice White appended a clarifying footnote that absolute
immunity should not apply to independent claims that the prosecutor withheld facts demonstrating the
falsity of the witness’s testimony in constitutionally material respects. Id. at 440 n. 5.
79
Id. at 441 (“I disagree with any implication that the absolute immunity extends to suits charging
unconstitutional suppression of evidence.”).
80
Id. at 442 (“one would expect that the judicial process would be protected and indeed its integrity
enhanced by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct”).
81
Id. at 442-443.
78
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Justice White, immunizing a prosecutor for not disclosing exculpatory evidence to the
defendant encourages nondisclosure and discourages disclosure. 82 Denying immunity to
a prosecutor for withholding evidence encourages disclosure and discourages
nondisclosure. 83 Justice White acknowledged that denying absolute immunity to a
prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence might encourage a prosecutor to
disclose more evidence than Brady required. 84 But such broader disclosure, Justice White
argued, “would hardly injure the judicial process.” 85 “Indeed, it will help it.” 86
Moreover, according to Justice White, constitutional violations that are committed
by prosecutors in open court such as improper summations, introduction of hearsay
testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause, and knowingly presenting false
testimony, clearly are integral parts of the judicial process, 87 and suggested that such
violations may be corrected by the judicial process. However, according to Justice White,
there is no way that the judicial process can correct a prosecutor’s suppression of
exculpatory evidence, for such conduct is hidden from the judicial process and the
suppressed evidence may never be discovered. 88 It is therefore all the more important to
deter such violations by permitting § 1983 damage actions in those cases where
violations are exposed, Justice White argued. 89 “The stakes are high,” Justice White

82

Id.
Id.
84
Id. at 443 (“A prosecutor seeking to protect himself from liability for failure to disclose evidence may be
induced to disclose more than is required.”).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 443.
88
Id. at 443-444 (“the judicial process has no way to prevent or correct the constitutional violation of
suppressing evidence [since] the judicial process will by definition be ignorant of the violation when it
occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never surface.”).
89
Id. at 444.
83
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observed, 90 citing Hilliard v. Williams, 91 in which the prosecutor’s suppression of
exculpatory evidence resulted in the conviction and punishment of an innocent defendant.
The injury to the judicial process from allowing prosecutors to evade civil liability for
such misconduct is easy to identify, according to Justice White. 92 However, he added, it
is “virtually impossible” to identify any injury to the judicial process from permitting
such suits. 93
In its Brady footnote, the majority saw no difference in principle between a
prosecutor knowingly presenting false testimony and a prosecutor suppressing evidence
that would demonstrate that falsity. “The distinction is not susceptible of practical
application,” the majority contended. 94 Moreover, the majority argued, to require a
prosecutor to make a ”full disclosure” of potentially exculpatory evidence to obtain
absolute immunity would place upon the prosecutor a duty that might far exceed the
disclosure requirements of Brady. 95 Moreover, according to the majority, denying
immunity to the prosecutor would “weaken the adversary system” as well as “interfere
with the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” 96
90

Id.
465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1972)(no absolute immunity for prosecutor in civil complaint charging prosecutor
with deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence), cert. granted and decision vacated, 420 U.S. 945
(1975), vacated on remand, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1976)(prosecutor absolutely immune from civil
liability for suppressing exculpatory police report and instructing witness to testify falsely).
92
Id. at 444-445.
93
Id. at 444-445 (“Where the reason for the rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it
would truly be ‘monstrous to deny recovery’”), citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
94
Id. at 431 n. 34. (“A claim of using perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of
suppression of the evidence upon which the knowledge of perjury rested.”).
95
Id.
96
Id. The majority suggested that there was no principled distinction between a prosecutor knowingly using
perjured testimony and knowingly suppressing information demonstrating the falsity. Id (“As a matter of
principle, we perceive no less an infringement of a defendant’s rights by the knowing use of perjured
testimony than by the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information.”). However, the majority likely
was aware that the distinction was neither unprincipled and nor abstract. Indeed, the Court would hear oral
arguments the following month, and decide later that Term in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
that the distinction between a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony and a prosecutor’s suppression
of exculpatory evidence were distinct violations. Moreover, in contrast to Imbler, the Court in Agurs
91
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III. The Brady Rule – Easily Evaded and Virtually Unenforceable
Of all the constitutional rules in criminal procedure that impose limits on a
prosecutor’s conduct, the rule of Brady v. Maryland 97 is unique in many ways. In all
other areas of criminal procedure a prosecutor is commanded by the constitution, statutes,
and ethics rules to refrain from striking foul blows. 98 Brady alone imposes on the
prosecutor a positive duty of fairness. By tempering the prosecutor’s traditional role of a
zealous advocate with that of a neutral minister of justice, Brady promised to transform
the U.S. criminal adversary system from a competitive sporting event into a more
balanced and objective search for the truth. 99 As the Court in Brady observed: “[S]ociety
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system

described the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence as grounded in elementary notions of
fairness to serve the cause of justice rather than as a function of a prosecutor’s role as an advocate seeking
to win a conviction. Id. at 111 (noting “prosecutor’s obligation to serve the cause of justice”)..
97
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
98
See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)(although prosecutor “may strike hard blows, he
is not at liberty to strike foul ones”); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n. 10 (2d Cir.
1994)(prosecutor has “special duty not to mislead”).
99
The prosecutor’s Brady duty is contained in FED.R.CRIM. P. R. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)(upon a defendant’s
request, prosecutor must disclose evidence if “the item is material to preparing the defense”). There are
widely inconsistent approaches in the U.S. courts at to what constitutes Brady evidence, the specific types
of information required to be disclosed, when it must be disclosed, and the sanctions for noncompliance.
See Treatment of Brady v. Maryland Material in United States District and State Courts’ Rules, Orders,
and Policies, REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (Federal Judicial Center 2004). Rule 16 does not
explicitly require a prosecutor to disclose all exculpatory information to the defense. In 2006, the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure voted eight to four to forward an amendment to the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure recommending an amendment to Rule 16
requiring a prosecutor to disclose to the defense all exculpatory information. See
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CR09-2006-min.pdf. The Department of Justice strongly opposed
the amendment and argued that changes in the United States Attorneys Manual dealing for the first time
with a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations and establishing guidelines for disclosure would make such an
amendment unnecessary. See
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm. But see United States v.
Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163, 171 (D. Mass. 2009)(change in U.S. Attorneys Manual “was not an unprompted
effort by the Department of Justice to address a problem that it perceived and acknowledged. Rather, it was
part of an ardent and, to date, successful effort of the Department to defeat a possible amendment to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”).
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of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” 100 Further,
in all other areas of constitutional criminal procedure in which an error has prejudiced a
defendant, it is typically the prosecution that bears the burden of proving that the error
was harmless. 101 Under Brady, however, it is the defendant who bears the burden to
establish that the prosecution’s suppression of favorable evidence was harmful. 102 Also,
in all other areas of constitutional criminal procedure, the commission of a constitutional
error – and a prosecutor’s suppression of evidence under Brady violates due process –
requires the prosecution to meet a much more stringent burden by proving that there is no
reasonable possibility that the violation would have altered the verdict. 103 Under Brady,
however, the defendant must prove that had it not been for the prosecutor’s suppression,
there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different. 104 A
reasonable probability, according to the Court, is a probability “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” 105
However, rather than producing a fundamental change in the criminal justice
system, Brady has become an illusory protection that is easily evaded and virtually
100

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Brady elaborated on this theme, alluding to the inscription on the walls of the
Justice Department: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”
Id.
101
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)(harmless error rule “put[s] the burden on the
beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously
obtained judgment”).
102
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985)(White, J., concurring)(“I agree with the Court
that respondent is not entitled to have his conviction overturned unless he can show that the evidence
withheld by the Government was ‘material’”); id. at 701 (Marshall, J,, dissenting)(criticizing standard that
requires defendant to “shoulder the heavy burden of proving how [the undisclosed evidence] would have
affected the outcome”).
103
See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)(“The question is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. at 24 (“There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of
Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”).
104
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (“The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”).
105
Id.
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unenforceable. 106 Brady represents a contradiction to the operation of the U.S. criminal
adversary system. The prosecutor, on the one hand, is encouraged to be a zealous
advocate charged with the responsibility of winning convictions against people who
break the law, but at the same time is encouraged to be a neutral minister of justice with
the duty to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence that might assist the
defendant in obtaining an acquittal. 107 Although Brady does not require a prosecutor to
provide the defense with open-ended discovery, 108 Brady does require the prosecutor to
sift through his files in a conscientious effort to identify any favorable evidence that
might assist a defendant in proving his innocence. Given “this obviously unharmonious
role” for a prosecutor, 109 Brady exemplifies a remarkable faith by the Supreme Court in
the capacity of prosecutors to subordinate their moral values, personal biases, and
competitive instincts to the overriding objective of the pursuit of truth in the service of
justice. For those prosecutors who “play the game to win,” as prosecutors typically do, 110
carefully analyzing the evidence, reexamining the hypothesis of guilt, and identifying

106

See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for
Innocence? Chapter 4, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES (Carol S. Streiker ed. 2006), at 154
(“Ultimately, though, our proceduralized adversarial model has rendered Brady, if not a dead letter, not a
very vigorous one either. Judges are too weak, prosecutors are too partisan, enforcement is too difficult,
discovery is too limited, and plea bargains are too widespread for Brady to influence many cases. Brady
remains an important symbol but is some ways a hollow one.”).
107
Id. at 696-697 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(“for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as
an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to identify the material that could
undermine his case”).
108
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)(prosecutor has “no duty to provide defense counsel
with unlimited discovery”). But see Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1522 (2000)(“Some defense attorneys are
fortunate to practice in jurisdictions that have “open-file” discovery practices and thus receive the material
early in the case.”).
109
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 697 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110
See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the
Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors? 38 CAL. W.L.REV. 283, 289-290
(2001)(observing that prosecutors readily admit that winning is important and that District Attorneys
Offices keep track of “batting averages” of prosecutors); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial &
Error: Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 1999, at N1 (describing prosecutorial
culture “where prosecutors recite conviction rates like boxers touting win-loss records”).
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defects and inconsistencies are undertaken not as a “minister of justice,” 111 but as a
zealous partisan who keeps score of his convictions, is motivated by the rewards of
winning, and is unlikely to sacrifice the conviction of a guilty defendant to an abstract
principle of justice. The Brady rule runs counter to these considerations.
Moreover, Brady’s counter-intuitiveness is based not only on general observations
of the interests and incentives of a prosecutor within the criminal adversary system;
Brady-compliance also runs counter to more nuanced considerations of the psychology of
a prosecutor as she prepares for adversarial combat. Any prosecutor preparing for trial
undoubtedly believes the defendant to be guilty and has assembled a cache of evidence to
prove the defendant’s guilt. Given the fact that that the prosecutor and the police have
virtually total control of the evidence from the start of the investigation, 112 there
inevitably may be evidence in the government’s files that contradicts guilt and which
might be viewed by a rational prosecutor as favorable to the defendant and subject to
Brady disclosure. By the same token, however, a rational prosecutor who has carefully
analyzed her proof in preparation for trial reasonably might view this contradictory
evidence as irrelevant, unpersuasive, or unreliable and certainly not of such probative
value to reach the high threshold of materiality that is required for disclosure under
Brady. 113 To be sure, a prosecutor has no discretion under Brady to refuse to search for

111

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.8 comment 1 (1983) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981)(“The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMNINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2(c)(3d ed.
1993)(“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1.1 (2d ed. 1991)(“The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that
justice is accomplished.”).
112
See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 314
(2001)(prosecutor enjoys “virtual monopoly of the fact-finding process”).
113
See infra notes 121-130, and accompanying text.
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materially favorable evidence, but a prosecutor has unfettered discretion to decide
whether any of that evidence must be disclosed. And given the mindset of prosecutors
preparing for trial, it is very likely that prosecutors are predisposed to view their
disclosure obligations quite narrowly. 114
But leaving aside intuitive judgments about a prosecutor’s mental state and socalled “conviction mentality,” it is becoming increasingly recognized by specialists in
cognitive psychology that a prosecutor’s predisposition probably is to ignore Brady.
Experts who have studied the existence and impact of various cognitive biases on
prosecutors recognize that prosecutors ordinarily make professional decisions based on
their personal beliefs, values, and incentives, and that these decisions may result in the
subversion of justice, even unintentionally. 115 These studies have examined the capacity
of prosecutors to maintain their neutrality and objectivity that compliance with Brady
requires, and have described the kinds of pressures and biases that operate on virtually all
of the discretionary decisions that prosecutors make, including the ability to maintain an
open mind that Brady-compliance requires.116 For instance, a prosecutor who is

114

See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 559
(1977)(prosecutors are convinced the defendant is guilty and view contradictory evidence as “irrelevant or
petty incongruity”); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 690
n. 24 (2006)(citing anecdotal evidence confirming prosecutors’ restrictive view of Brady obligation). For a
recent example of this prosecutorial mindset in a highly-publicized prosecution of a United States Senator,
see United States v. Stevens, Cr. No. 08-231 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009)(Hearing)(Docket No. 372) at 4-7
(district judge identifies at least 12 instances where the prosecution team “was caught making false
representations and not meeting its discovery obligations,” and as the court listed the violations, the court
noted the government’s responses – “testimony was immaterial;” government acted in “good faith;” “just a
mistake;” “mistaken understanding;” evidence was “immaterial;” nondisclosure was :”inadvertent;”
nondisclosure was “unintentional;” documents were “immaterial;” complaint by FBI agent against
prosecutors for their misconduct had “no relevancy” and could be adequately addressed by the Office of
Professional Responsibility.).
115
See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 296-307 (describing case studies in tunnel vision by prosecutors that subverted
justice).
116
See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006)(describing prosecutorial decision-making as often “irrational”
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convinced of a defendant’s guilt – and what prosecutor is not convinced -- may exhibit a
so-called “tunnel vision” whereby she ignores, overlooks, or dismisses evidence that
might be favorable to a defendant as being irrelevant, incredible, or unreliable. 117 Similar
kinds of cognitive biases that operate on a prosecutor’s decision-making include
“confirmation bias” that credits evidence that confirms one’s theory of guilt, and
discounts evidence that disconfirms that theory; 118 “selective information processing,”
that inclines one to weigh evidence that supports one’s belief in the defendant’s guilt
more heavily than evidence that contradicts those beliefs; 119 “belief perseverance,” that
describes a tendency to adhere to one’s chosen theory even though new evidence comes
to light that completely undercuts that theory’s evidentiary basis; 120 and “avoidance of
cognitive dissonance,” under which a person tends to adjust his or her beliefs to conform
to their behavior. 121 All of these biases plainly are impediments to rational decisionmaking and make it perfectly understandable that a prosecutor, wearing the mantle of a
zealous advocate seeking to win a conviction, would probably overestimate the strength
of his case and underestimate the probative value of evidence that contradicts or
undermines his case, and the latter evidence is precisely the kind of evidence that a
prosecutor is required to identify and disclose under Brady.
Finally, apart from the adversarial pressures on prosecutors that discourage
Brady-compliance, compounded by the cognitive biases that make compliance even more
unlikely, is the judiciary’s permissive interpretation of the prosecutor’s duty under Brady
because of cognitive biases). Having served as a prosecutor for several years, as well as being a long-time
observer of prosecutorial conduct, I am inclined to agree with much of Professor Burke’s commentary).
117
See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L. J. 475
(2006); Findley & Scott, supra note 115.
118
See Burke, supra note 14, at 1594-96.
119
Id. at 1596-99.
120
Id. at 1599-1602.
121
Id. at 1601-02.
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that affords prosecutors a virtual license to evade Brady with impunity. Brady, as
originally understood, required a prosecutor to make a prospective, pretrial determination
as to the probative value of certain evidence in his possession that might be materially
favorable to the accused and to immediately disclose that evidence. 122 However, this
prospective duty of the prosecutor mutated into a retrospective, post-conviction
determination by an appellate court as to whether the prosecutor’s nondisclosure, in the
context of the entire record at trial, makes it reasonably probable that, had the evidence
been disclosed, the defendant would have been found not guilty. 123 By adopting this
retrospective, post-trial standard to define the scope of the defendant’s constitutional right
to certain evidence prior to trial, the Court made it increasingly easy for prosecutors to
evade their Brady duty simply by claiming that given the strength of their case, and the
confidence they had in the quality of their evidence, they believed that it would be
inconceivable that any evidence they possessed might reasonably be viewed as so
favorable to the accused that it would be reasonably probable that with this evidence the
defendant would be found not guilty. What rational prosecutor would ever reach such a

122

See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2001)(suggesting that Court in Brady “appears
to be using the word ‘material’ in its evidentiary sense, i.e., evidence that has some probative tendency to
preclude a finding of guilt or lessen punishment”).
123
Bagley, 473 U.S. 699-700 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(Brady duty defined “not by reference to the
possible usefulness of the particular evidence in preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively by
reference to likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial”). See United States v. Coppa,
267 F.3d at142:
The result of the progression from Brady to Agurs and Bagley is that the nature of the prosecutor’s
constitutional duty has shifted from (a) an evidentiary test of materiality that can be applied rather
easily to any item of evidence (would this evidence have some tendency to undermine proof of
guilt?) to (b) a result-affecting test that obliges a prosecutor to make a prediction as to whether a
reasonable probability will exist that the outcome would have been different if disclosure had been
made. To put it another way, Bagley makes the extent of the disclosure required by Brady
dependent on the anticipated remedy for violation of the obligation to disclose: the prosecutor
must disclose evidence if, without such disclosure, a reasonable probability will exist that the
outcome of a trial in which the evidence had been disclosed would have been different (emphasis
in original)..
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conclusion? 124 Under this perverse standard of constitutional due process, a prosecutor is
encouraged to play games, 125 i.e., to “gamble” and “play the odds,” 126 to “bury his head
in the sand,” 127 play “hide and seek” with the accused, 128 and require the accused to
undertake a “scavenger hunt” for hidden Brady clues. 129 And further emboldening a
prosecutor to evade Brady with impunity is the knowledge that the undisclosed evidence

124

Consider Professor Scott Sundby’s tongue-in-cheek rumination about a hypothetical “ethical”
prosecutor’s mental process in deciding whether a particular piece of evidence is material under Brady and
therefore must be disclosed:
This piece of evidence is so exculpatory in nature that it actually undermines my belief that a
guilty verdict would be worthy of confidence. Under Brady, therefore, I need to turn this evidence
over to the defense. Then, once I turn the evidence over and satisfy my constitutional obligation, I
can resume my zealous efforts to obtain a guilty verdict that I have just concluded will not be
worthy of confidence.
See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 653 (2002).
125
See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 531 (2007).
126
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(Brady standard of materiality “invites a prosecutor,
whose interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a chance that evidence will later
turn out not to have been potentially dispositive”).
127
United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990). See Gershman, supra note 125, at 551
(“The prosecutor’s claim of ignorance as an excuse for compliance with Brady resembles a defendant’s
claim of ignorance as an excuse to avoid criminal liability.”). But see David Luban, Contrived Ignorance,
87 GEO. L. J. 957, 976 (1999)(“in legal ethics, unlike criminal law, there is no willful blindness doctrine”).
128
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004)(“A rule thus declaring ‘prosecution may hide, defendant
must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendant due process.”).
129
Id. at 695 (“Our decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of
undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been disclosed.”).
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probably will remain hidden forever, 130 and that even if the evidence ever does surface,
the obstacles to a defendant successfully using it are daunting. 131
Thus, given a prosecutor’s predisposition and incentives to evade Brady, it should
come as no surprise that Brady violations are serious, pervasive, and rarely subject to
sanctions of any kind. Indeed, given the ease with which Brady evidence may be
concealed and remain hidden, 132 one may surmise that the documented violations
probably represent only a fraction of the total number of Brady violations. Moreover,
since no records or statistics are kept by courts, prosecutor offices, or other government
agencies of the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct, the effort to document misconduct
is difficult to measure accurately. Nevertheless, there exists a large and growing body of
empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that Brady violations are the most common
type of prosecutorial misconduct, 133 often occurring in the same prosecutor’s office, 134

130

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443-444 (White, J., concurring)(“The judicial process will by definition be ignorant
of the violation when it occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never surface.”);
United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996)(“the government’s failure to turn over
exculpatory information in its possession is unlikely to be discovered and thus largely unreviewable”);
United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984)(“[W]e are left with the nagging concern that
material favorable to the defense may never emerge from secret government files.”), vacated sub nom.
United States v. Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985)(mem.). See also Elizabeth Napier Dewar, A Fair Trial
Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L. J. 1450, 1455 (2006)(“Defendants only rarely unearth
suppressions”); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So
Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1579 (2000)(arguing that in most cases “withheld evidence will
never see the light of day”); Bibas, supra note 106, at 142 (“Because Brady material is hidden in
prosecutors’ and police files, defense lawyers probably will never learn of its existence. Most defendants
lack the investigative resources to dig up Brady material.”).
131
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)(imposing stringent pleading requirements imposing on
plaintiff need to show that claim is facially plausible and contains sufficient factual content that allows
court to draw reasonable inference that defendant is liable for misconduct).
132
See supra notes 122-131, and accompanying text.
133
See John F. Terzano & Alanna D. Holt, Improving Prosecutorial Accountability – A Policy Review, The
Justice project (2009), at 9 (“Suppression of exculpatory evidence is the most widespread and common
form of prosecutorial misconduct.”).
134
See Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct?
THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 2003, at 3-4 (analyzing 11,451 cases since 1970 in which
charges of prosecutorial misconduct were reviewed by appellate courts and found that in many instances
the misconduct occurred in the same office, often by the same prosecutor); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful
Convictions: It is Time to take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C. L. REV. 275, 281-282
(2004)(noting seventy-two reported cases of prosecutorial misconduct from the Bronx district Attorney’s
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often committed by the same prosecutor, 135 and that appear to occur disproportionately in
capital cases. 136 And, tragically, Brady violations have been a principal cause of
convictions of innocent persons. 137
The documentation of widespread violations of Brady is striking. A 1999 national
study by the Chicago Tribune of 11,000 homicide convictions between 1963 and 1999
found that 381 of these convictions were reversed for Brady violations. 138 Sixty-seven of
these defendants had been sentenced to death, 139 many of whom were subsequently
exonerated. 140 A 2003 report by the Center for Public Integrity analyzed 11,452 post1970 convictions that appellate courts reviewed for prosecutorial misconduct, and which
found reversible misconduct in 2,012 cases, the majority of them for Brady violations. 141
A 2000 study by Columbia Law School of error rates in capital cases found that apart
from errors relating to incompetent counsel, the most frequent basis for reversible error in

Office between 1975-1996, eighteen of which involved reversals of convictions based on prosecutorial
suppression of exculpatory evidence).
135
See Weinberg, supra note , at 3 (study finds many “recidivist prosecutors” around the country had “bent
or broken the rules multiple times”).
136
See JAMES LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (noting that prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory
evidence accounted for 16%% to 19% of reversible errors); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN, L. REV. 21, 23-24, 57 (1987)(finding that
thirty-five of 350 wrongful capital convictions resulted from prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory
evidence). Most of the post-Brady decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court addressing a prosecutor’s
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence occurred in capital cases.
137
See Weinberg, supra note 134 at 2 (noting that in 28 cases involving 32 defendants, misconduct by
prosecutors, including suppression of exculpatory evidence, led to the conviction of innocent persons);
United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163, 170 (D. Mass. 2009)(noting that ‘in response to a disturbing
number of wrongful convictions resulting in death sentences, in 2002 the Illinois Commission on Capital
Punishment recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court ‘adopt a rule defining ‘exculpatory evidence’ in
order to provide guidance to counsel in making appropriate disclosures.”); Bennett L. Gershman,
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.685, 688 n. 18 (2006)(listing several cases in which
a prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence led to the conviction of innocent persons).
138
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 1999, at 3.
139
Id.
140
Id. Six months after the Chicago Tribune series was published, several more people convicted of murder
received new trials based on a finding that prosecutors failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defense.
See Maurice Possley and Ken Armstrong, Historic Case Sent Ripples Through Legal Community,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 6, 1999, at 1.
141
See supra note 134, at 2.
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capital cases was attributable to Brady violations. 142 A report by the California
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice examined 2,130 state cases over a tenyear period ending in 2006 in which claims of prosecutorial misconduct were raised. 143
Misconduct was found in 443 of these cases, or 21%. Violations of Brady were one of the
most common forms of misconduct. An examination by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette in
1998 of over 1,500 cases found that Brady violations were pervasive and that courts
hardly ever reversed convictions. 144
In addition to these empirical studies, the widespread incidence of Brady
violations is also a matter of increasing concern to the courts. Dozens of cases in the
federal courts since 2007 have found serious Brady violations. 145 In an extraordinary
142

See supra note 136 at 5.
See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Report and
Recommendations on Reporting Misconduct, Oct. 18, 2007, at 3 (“The most common forms of misconduct
found were failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and improper argument.”).
144
See Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998 (study of over
1,500 cases nationwide during past decade found hundreds of cases in which prosecutors intentionally
concealed exculpatory evidence).
145
For recent cases in the U.S. Supreme Court involving Brady violations, see Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct.
1769 (2009)(remanded for hearing into prosecutor’s suppression of evidence regarding seriousness of
defendant’s drug problem); Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006)(suppression of evidence
indicating that testimony of key witness was false).
For recent Brady cases (not an exhaustive list) in which the Circuit Courts of Appeal granted
relief, or criticized prosecutors for nondisclosures, see United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir.
2009)(nondisclosure of mental health records of confidential informant requires vacating conviction);
Simmons v. Beard, 581 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2009)(suppression ov evidence discrediting key witness violates
due process); Montgomery v. Bagley, 581 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2009)(suppression of police report
undermining credibility of key witness violates due process); United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155 (3d Cir.
2009)(nondisclosure of back of hotel registration card suggesting defendant had registered in hotel required
vacating conviction); United States v. Burke, 571 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009)(court greatly concerned that
prosecutor’s belated disclosure “encourages gamesmanship” and “creates dangerous incentives [to
misconduct]” but defendant did not show material prejudice); United States v. Torres, 569 F.3d 1277 (10th
Cir. 2009)(nondisclosure that confidential informant had been retained by government on two previous
occasions required vacating conviction); United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009)(nondisclosure
of extensive criminal history of key government witness requires vacating conviction); Douglas v.
Workman, 560 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009)(suppression of deal with key witness violates due process);
United States v. Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)(court “deeply concerned” at prosecutor’s
belated disclosure of key evidence and at prosecutor’s justification which is “beneath a member of the Bar
representing the United States before this Court” but defendant failed to prove prejudice); ); United States
v. Gibson, 328 Fed. Appx. 860 (4th Cir. 2009)(new trial ordered on some counts based on prosecutor’s
discovery violation); Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2009)(suppression of evidence that key
witness promised substantial benefits for his testimony); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 544
143
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decision last May in United States v. Jones, 146 United States District Judge Mark L. Wolf
castigated the federal prosecutor for her “egregious” Brady violation, stating that “this
case extends a dismal history of intentional and inadvertent violations of the
government’s duties to disclose in cases assigned to this court.” 147 Judge Wolf appended
Appeals and Federal District Courts in which the courts vacated convictions for serious

F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008)((new trial ordered based on prosecutor’s “inexplicably withholding” material
exculpatory and impeachment evidence); United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2008)(nondisclosure of DEA reports materially prejudicial and new trial ordered); Unite States v. Lopez,
534 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2008)(prosecutor’s Brady violation “troubling” but motion for new trial denied);
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008)(suppression of several items of exculpatory evidence
that substantially contradicts testimony of state’s only eyewitness); United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d
171, 180 (2d Cir. 2008)(Sotomayor, J.)(court “troubled” and “disappointed” by prosecutor’s belated
disclosure of exculpatory evidence and prosecutor’s argument that evidence not material disingenous but
defendant failed to shop prejudice0; United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008)(prosecutor’s
“unconscionable,” “willful,” and “bad faith” violation of discovery obligations and “flagrant”
misrepresentations to court justified mistrial United States v. Zomber, 299 Fed. Appx. 130 (3d Cir.
2008)(prosecutor’s discovery violation requires reversal of conviction and new trial); United States v.
Garcia, 271 Fed. Appx. 347 (4th Cir. 2008)(prosecutor’s failure to disclose key impeachment evidence not
prejudicial because defendant’s counsel uncovered information day before witness testified); United States
v. Butler, 275 Fed. Appx. 816 (11th Cir. 2008)(suppression of impeachment evidence but no new trial);
United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2007)(remanded for hearing on Brady violation but court
observes that given conflicting statements, “United States Attorney’s word is worth considerably less”);
Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)(suppression of evidence of cooperation agreement with
key witness); United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007)(en banc)(prosecutor suppresses
evidence that other similar bank robberies were committed by someone after defendant’s arrest who bore
striking resemblance to defendant); United States v. garner, 507 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2007)(belated disclosure
of evidence used to impeach government’s key witness violates due process); United States v. Velarde, 485
F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 2007)(suppression of evidence undermining credibility of key witness violates due
process); United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2007)(remanded for Brady hearing after
prosecution witness admits lies in initial interviews and prosecutor seeks to avoid disclosure by not taking
notes); Trammel v. McKune, 485 F.3d 546 (10th Cir. 2007)(in theft prosecution, suppression of receipts
linking third party to theft violated due process); United States v. Chases, 230 Fed. Appx. 761 (9th Cir.
2007)(no reversal but court admonishes prosecution for “shocking sloppiness” in carrying out its disclosure
duty); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006)(nondisclosure of recantation by key
government witness was “blatant” and “so outrageous” as to undermine defendant’s guilty plea); United
States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006)(suppression of evidence discrediting testimony of key witness
violates due process).
For recent cases in the district courts (not an exhaustive list) where relief was granted based on
Brady violations, see United states v. Shaygan, 2009 WL 989289 (S.D. Fla. 2009); United States v.
Stevens, Cr. No., 08-231 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009)Docket No. 372); United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d
163 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Fitzgerald, 615 F. Supp.2d 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Cardoso v. United
States, 642 F. Supp.2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Hernandez v. City of El Paso, 2009 WL 2096272 (W.D.
Tex.); United States v. Quinn, 537 F. Supp.2d 99 (D.D.C. 2008); United States United States v. Freeman,
2009 WL 2748483 (N.D.Ill.)(prosecutor’s misconduct in allowing witness’s false testimony to materially
prejudice defendants requires new trial); Sykes v. United States, 897 A.2d 769 (D.C. App. 2006).
146
620 F. Supp.2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009).
147
Id. at 165.
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Brady violations. 148 And in two recent highly-publicized prosecutions – the Duke
Lacrosse case and the federal trial of then-Senator Ted Stevens – Brady violations were
discovered that were so serious as to result in the conviction of criminal contempt and
disbarment of the Duke prosecutor, Michael Nifong, 149 and the federal district court’s
vacating of Stevens’ conviction, dismissing the charges, the commencing criminal
contempt proceedings against six prosecutors for obstruction of justice. 150 What is so
disconcerting about the misconduct by the prosecutors in the Duke lacrosse and Stevens
cases is the realization that if a prosecutor is willing to violate Brady in a case of such
high public visibility and media scrutiny, how much more likely is it that a prosecutor
will violate Brady with impunity in the thousands of cases involving anonymous and
invisible defendants?
************************

Imbler failed to appreciate the uniqueness of the Brady rule, the mindset of
prosecutors that invites them to hide exculpatory evidence, and the ease with which
prosecutors are able to violate Brady. Imbler worried that a civil action against a
prosecutor would dampen the prosecutor’s “courage,” “independence,” and “energy,” 151
and that an “honest” prosecutor would have greater difficulty in defending himself from
“error” and “mistaken judgment” than other officials cloaked with qualified immunity. 152
To be sure, although Pachtman was accused of Brady violations, the Court appeared to
148

Id. at 185-193.
See Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment For Prosecutor in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2007, at 21; Shaila Dewan, DukeProsecutorJailed; Students Seek Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007.
See North Carolina State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (June 16, 2007).
150
See United States v. Stevens, Cr. No. 08-231 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009)(Motion Hearing)(Docket No. 372).
(district court appoints special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the matter). Id. at p. 46-47.
151
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-425.
152
Id. at 425.
149
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view his conduct at most as an error, a mistake of judgment, or negligent rather than as
willful misconduct. And given the record in that case, it is neither surprising nor counterintuitive that Imbler chose to minimize the need for a civil remedy with respect to a
prosecutor’s conduct generally, and with respect to a prosecutor’s Brady violations in
particular. It is also noteworthy that the Court focused on the prosecutor’s conduct in
open court, and the advocacy decisions that a prosecutor makes before and during a trial
that are subject to judicial review. The Court lumped together all of the conduct of a
prosecutor that is related to the trial, apparently including all actions undertaken before
trial, in secret, shielded from public scrutiny, and not subject to judicial oversight, such as
Brady decisions. To the extent that the Court assumed that a prosecutor’s duty under
Brady to disclose evidence is undertaken as an “advocate” rather than as a “minister of
justice,” the Court lost sight of the special responsibilities assigned to the prosecutor by
Brady. And, by removing the sanction of civil liability from such misconduct, Imbler
gave prosecutors a further incentive to disregard their constitutional responsibilities.

IV. Lack of Accountability for Brady Violations
Imbler acknowledged that the immunity it created left a wronged defendant
without a civil remedy. 153 However, the Court added, this absence “does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.” 154 According to
Imbler, the policy considerations that mandate civil immunity for prosecutors do not
place prosecutors beyond the reach of the criminal law, suggesting that prosecutors

153

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (“To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”).
154
Id. at 429.
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would be subject to criminal prosecution for willful acts that violate the criminal law. 155
Imbler also observed that a prosecutor who “stands perhaps unique, among officials
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights,” would be subject to
professional discipline by bar associations. 156 “These checks,” Imbler asserted,
“undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure
that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.” 157
Imbler’s confidence that prosecutors would face both criminal and professional
sanctions for their misconduct has proved to be dramatically mistaken. Indeed, one of the
central themes in criminal procedure and professional ethics since Imbler has been the
lack of accountability of prosecutors for their misconduct, and especially for their
misconduct that involves the deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. 158 As noted

155

Id. (“This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for
certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked
with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of
constitutional rights…The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts.”).
156
Id. (suggesting that a prosecutor is “perhaps unique…in his amenability to professional discipline by an
association of his peers”).
157
Id.
158
See John F. Terzano & Alanna Holt, Improving Prosecutorial Accountability – A Policy Review, The
Justice Project (2009)(describing prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct, absence of significant restraints
on misconduct, and recommending ways to improve accountability); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C.L. REV. 721, 756-762, 774 (2001)(noting rarity of discipline against
prosecutors); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously,8 D.C.L. REV. 275, 277 (2004)(professional discipline for prosecutor’s misconduct “is often
nil”); Kenneth Rosenthal , Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an
Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998)(“[T]here is a notable absence of disciplinary
sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases.”); Bruce A. Green Prosecutorial Ethics as
Usual, 2003 U.ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1596 (2003)(noting that existing rules of ethics fail to regulate large
areas of prosecutors’ professional conduct); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors
for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693, 697 (1987)(“[D]isciplinary charges have been
brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions [have been] rarely applied.”); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong
Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 898 (1997)(noting that disciplinary process “has been almost
totally ineffective in sanctioning even egregious Brady violations”); Angela J. Davis, The Legal
profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 282
(2007)(describing disciplinary process as “woefully inadequate in holding prosecutors accountable for
misconduct”). See also Armstrong & Possely, supra note 110 (1999 study of 381 cases in which courts
dismissed homicide convictions based on Brady violations revealed that not one prosecutor was publicly
sanctioned by a state disciplinary authority or criminally prosecuted for withholding evidence or presenting
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above, 159 a significant body of empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates that Brady
violations are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Yet paradoxically, despite
this systemic malfunction, there also appears to be a systemic inability to fix the problem.
Imbler’s expectation that prosecutors who violate the law would face criminal
penalties seemed extreme at the time, and the prospect seems even more farfetched today.
To support its view of the likelihood of criminal prosecutions against prosecutors, Imbler
cited a California case, In re Branch, 160 and stated: “California also appears to provide
for criminal punishment of a prosecutor who commits some of the acts ascribed to
respondent by petitioner.” 161 The Court’s extrapolation of a general principle from a case

false evidence); Center for Public Integrity, supra note 134, at 79 (finding only forty-four cases of
professional discipline of prosecutors out of 2,012 cases reversed since 1970 due to misconduct; of the 44
cases, seven resulted in dismissal of the complaint, 20 in a reprimand or censure, 12 in a suspended license,
two in disbarment, 24 in a fine, and 3 in remand for further proceedings); Mike Zapler, State Bar Ignores
Errant Lawyers, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 12, 2006, at 1 (finding that of 1,464 lawyer discipline cases
published in the California Bar Journal between 2001 and 2005, only one case involved disciplinary action
against a prosecutor for misconduct).
Professional Discipline by the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) also has been criticized as inadequate. See DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET
DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 331 (1996)(“The systemic failure of this tiny, extremely passive unit to confront directly the
misconduct of Justice Department officials must be considered one of the most serious lapses in the
department’s recent history.”); Greg Rushford, Watching the Watchdog: Veteran Justice Department Ethics
Officer Faces Questions About His Own Actions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at 1 (criticizing
effectiveness of Office of Professional Responsibility). See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,
522 (1983)(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(“Prior experience, for example, might
have demonstrated the futility of relying on Department of Justice disciplinary proceedings.”); Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the
Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U.L. REV. 1, 16 n. 75 (2009)(noting that OPR oversight of federal
prosecutors is “uncertain”). In the aftermath of his dismissal of the conviction of then-Senator Ted Stevens
of Alaska based on the prosecutors’ withholding exculpatory evidence, Federal District Judge Emmet G.
Sullivan appointed a special prosecutor to investigate whether the six Justice Department prosecutors
should face criminal charges for their misconduct. The judge expressed little confidence that the Office of
Professional Responsibility would conduct a proper and effective inquiry. See United States v. Stevens, Cr.
08-231 (hearing, Apr. 7, 2009) Docket No. 372, at 45-46 (expressing obvious lack of confidence in OPR’s
claim, made six months earlier, to conduct an investigation, and that to date, “the silence is deafening;”
court also expresses “shock but not surprise” at lack of response by then-U.S. Attorney General Michael
Mukasey to numerous letters from defense counsel urging commencement of formal investigation of
prosecutors).
159
See supra notes 133-150, and accompanying text.
160
449 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1969).
161
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429 n. 29. The Court’s reference to Branch is perplexing, and somewhat
disingenuous. Branch reviewed a habeas petition by a California inmate convicted of possessing deadly
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that does not even support that principle, 162 was illogical then, and is even more
unsupportable today. In fact, criminal sanctions against a prosecutor have hardly ever
been enforced, either in California, or anywhere else in the United States. 163 An extensive
search through the internet has located not a single instance in California since Imbler in
which a prosecutor has been criminally prosecuted for acts related to his prosecutorial
duties. 164 A nationwide search for instances of criminal charges against prosecutors in the
last twenty-five years has turned up two criminal prosecutions stemming from highlypublicized criminal cases in which prosecutors were charged with crimes related to their
deliberate violations of Brady. In 1999 in Chicago, county prosecutor Thomas L. Knight
was charged by a special prosecutor with obstruction of justice, perjury, and conspiracy
for his suppression of “obviously exculpatory” evidence that put an innocent man on
death row in the murder of a 10-year-old girl. 165 Knight was acquitted. In 2007 in Detroit,

weapons in his cell, who claimed that his attorney failed to conduct an adequate investigation that other
prisoners had committed the same offense. The attorney at a hearing stated that he refused to act upon the
petitioner’s request because he had good reason to believe that the proposed testimony would be perjured.
The appellate court noted that “an attorney may not knowingly allow a witness to testify falsely,” and that
”an attorney who attempts to benefit his client through the use of perjured testimony may be subject to
criminal prosecution.” Id. at 210. Thus, Branch did not involve the prosecution of a prosecutor, as the
Court’s citation would lead one to believe, nor did Branch suggest that a prosecutor would be subject to
criminal charges, or that any prosecutor had ever been prosecuted in California for suborning perjury.
Indeed, of the many hundreds of reported cases in California and the U.S. in which prosecutors have been
found to have knowingly elicited false testimony, not one of those prosecutors as far as I have been able to
determine has ever been subjected to criminal prosecution for suborning perjury.
162
Id..
163
See Brink, supra note 12 at 27 (“leveling of criminal charges against a prosecutor for conduct occurring
in the course of a prosecution is all but unheard of”); Andrew Smith, Brady Obligations, Criminal
Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61 VAND. L. REV. 19351969-1970 (2008)(arguing that
prosecutors could be charged criminally with violating 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analogue to § 1983,
and noting one case in which a local prosecutor was convicted in federal court under § 242 for violating
Brady). See Brophy v. Committee on Professional Standards, Third Judicial Department, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818
(N.Y. App. 1981)(Brophy convicted of § 242 misdemeanor and sentenced to pay a fine of $500; in light of
his contention that his violation was :”inadvertent,” and his previously unblemished record, court believed
a censure would be an appropriate disciplinary sanction).
164
It goes without saying that a criminal prosecution against a prosecutor for any reason, and especially for
crimes related to his prosecutorial function, would be a newsworthy event. The failure to uncover a single
instance of a criminal prosecution, while not dispositive, strongly supports the conclusion.
165
See Andrew Bluth, Prosecutor and 4 Sheriff’s Deputies Are Acquitted of Wrongfully Accusing a Man of
Murder, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A9.
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federal prosecutor Richard Convertino was charged by the U.S. Department of Justice
with conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and making false statements in connection with
his suppression of evidence in a high-profile terrorism trial in 2003. 166 Convertino was
acquitted. Indeed, of the hundreds of cases involving Brady violations noted above, 167
many of which were intentional, egregious, and easily provable as an obstruction of
justice, no criminal action was brought against the prosecutor even though the prosecutor
in many of these cases caused the conviction and lengthy incarceration of an innocent
person. 168 If Imbler’s prediction was even remotely accurate, one might have expected to
see criminal charges brought against at least some of those prosecutors. But this has not
happened.
Imbler also confidently predicted that a prosecutor would be amenable to
professional discipline by bar associations. 169 But as with Imbler’s prediction of criminal
prosecutions, the imposition of professional discipline against prosecutors has also been
extraordinarily rare. Although state bar associations, grievance committees, and the
Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility have regulatory authority over
prosecutors, and have the power to discipline prosecutors for violations of rules of
professional ethics, virtually every commentator has criticized the absence of
professional discipline of prosecutors, even in cases of obvious and easily provable
violations, and even in cases in which a court has issued a stinging rebuke of the
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See Terror Case Prosecutor Acquitted of Rigging Trial Jury: Convertino and Agent Didn’t Hide
Evidence, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 1, 2007, at A1.
167
See supra notes 134-150, and accompanying text.
168
See, e.g., Center for Public Integrity, supra note 134 at 1 (finding that of the 2,012 cases in which courts
reversed convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct since 1970, reversals often attributable to Brady
violations, 32 of these individuals were found to be innocent); Gershman, supra note 137, at 688 n. 18
(identifying several cases in which a prosecutor’s violation of Brady contributed to the conviction and
incarceration of an innocent person).
169
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
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prosecutor. 170 The absence of professional discipline is particularly glaring in cases
involving intentional Brady violations. Indeed, of all the ethical rules relating to a
prosecutor’s professional conduct, the ethics rule governing a prosecutor’s suppression of
evidence is the most explicit and easiest to enforce. 171 Nonetheless, although one might
reasonably expect that such conduct would be viewed by professional disciplinary bodies
as unethical, and even dangerous, professional disciplinary bodies for a variety of reasons
typically maintain a hands-off approach. 172 Indeed, from an examination of the numerous
instances of serious Brady violations noted above, very few of the offending prosecutors
was ever subjected to professional discipline, or even investigated by disciplinary bodies.
Given this regulatory vacuum by professional disciplinary bodies, several lower
courts have begun to take a much more aggressive stand against prosecutorial abuses in
an effort to make prosecutors accountable for their misconduct. This is especially
noticeable in cases where prosecutors have committed serious Brady violations. Thus, in
United States v. Stevens, .which involved the high-profile prosecution and conviction of
then-Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, Federal District Emmet G. Sullivan dismissed the
170

See supra note 158, and accompanying text.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.11(a)(1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES AND REGULATIONS 1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed. 2001).
See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n. 15 (“Although the due process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to
disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory
obligations.”); Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)(noting that Brady “requires less of the
prosecution than the ABA Standards”).
172
See supra note 158, and accompanying text. Occasionally an offending prosecutor is punished by a
disciplinary body, and the event often elicits media attention. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Killer Instincts:
Did a Famous Prosecutor put the Wrong Man on Death Row, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2005, at 54
(discussing a county prosecutor who was disbarred for deliberately presenting a witness’s false testimony
in two death penalty trials); Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment For Prosecutor in Duke Case N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2007, at 21 (discussing the case of District Attorney Michael Nifong, prosecutor in Duke
lacrosse case, who was disbarred, among other misconduct, for suppressing exculpatory evidence); Howard
Mint, State Bar Judge Wants Santa Clara County Prosecutor Suspended, Feb. 11, 2009, at 1 (discussing
Benjamin Field, a county prosecutor who was described in a newspaper series as a “repeat offender” and
was brought before the State Bar of California for misconduct in multiple cases spanning a decade).
171
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charges against the defendant with prejudice after finding that the prosecution had
suppressed material exculpatory evidence. 173 Judge Sullivan appointed a special counsel
to investigate the conduct of the offending trial prosecutors and their supervisors in the
Justice Department and to consider criminal contempt and obstruction of justice charges
for violating the court’s order to turn over to the defense all material exculpatory
evidence. 174 Similarly, in United States v. Shaygan, 175 after finding that the prosecution
had violated Brady, Federal District Judge Alan S. Gold in Florida granted the defendant
a monetary award under the Hyde Amendment of $601, 795, 176 imposed individual
sanctions against the two Assistant United States Attorneys, and ordered the United
States Attorney to establish procedures` to improve the supervision of attorneys in the
office. The conduct of the prosecutors, according to Judge Gold, raised “disturbing” and
“troubling” questions about the “integrity of those who wield enormous power over the
people they prosecute.” 177 Judge Gold added that the U.S. Attorney General must create a

173

See United States v. Stevens, Cr. No. 08-231 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009)(Docket No. 372), at 3 (“In nearly
25 years on the bench, I’ve never seen anything approaching the mishandling and misconduct that I’ve seen
in this case.”).
174
Id.
175
2009 WL 980289 (S.D. Fla.).
176
The Hyde Amendment was enacted by Congress in 1998 and is located in a statutory note to 18 U.S.C. §
3006A. It provides in relevant part that courts may award attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses to
prevailing criminal defendants “where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious,
frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make the award unjust.” Pub. L.
No. 105-119,111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997)(reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Since its enactment, “prevailing
criminal defendants” have applied for Hyde fees in approximately 200 reported cases, and have been
successful in less than 10% of the cases. Courts have struggled to define the operative terms. See United
States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 193, 1298-1299 (11th Cir. 1999)(finding that “vexatious” means without
probable cause or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith; “frivolous” means
groundless and with little prospect of success brought primarily to embarrass or annoy the defendant; and
“bad faith” is the conscious doing of wrong because of a dishonest purpose, a furtive design, or ill will,
requiring more than bad judgment or negligence). According to Judge Gold, “the position taken by
[Assistant United States Attorney] Cronin the prosecution] in filing the superseding indictment, in initiating
and pursuing the collateral investigation based on unfounded allegations; suppressing information about the
roles of two key government witnesses as cooperating witnesses in the collateral investigation; and
attempting to secure evidence from the collateral investigation that would have jeopardized the trial and
severely prejudiced the defendant, constitute bad faith.” Shaygan, slip. op. at 29..
177
Shaygan, slip op. at 2.
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culture where a “’win-at-any-cost’ prosecution is not permitted,” and that courts must
impose sanctions for substantial prosecutorial abuses in order to “make the risk of noncompliance too costly.” 178
Finally, in United States v. Jones, 179 Federal District Judge Mark L. Wolf in
Massachusetts found that “[t]he egregious failure of the government to disclose plainly
material exculpatory evidence in this case extends a dismal history of intentional and
inadvertent violations of the government’s duties.” 180 In a separate opinion addressing
whether sanctions should be imposed, 181 Judge Wolf stated that the conduct of the
prosecutor “reflects a fundamentally flawed understanding of her obligations, or a
reckless disregard of them, despite many years of experience as a prosecutor, substantial
training by the Department of Justice, and an explanation of her obligations by this
Court.” 182 Judge Wolf warned that he would institute criminal contempt proceedings
against offending prosecutors in future cases and would publicly name these prosecutors
in published decisions. 183 Finally, pointing to the repeated violations by prosecutors in
his court, Judge Wolf expressed dismay that it could no longer rely on the Department of
Justice training programs, and therefore would arrange for its own training program to
educate prosecutors on their discovery responsibilities in criminal cases. 184

178

Id. at 3 (“It is equally important that the courts of the United States must let it be known that, when
substantial abuses occur, sanctions will be imposed to make the risk of non-compliance too costly.”).
179
609 F. Supp.2d 113 (D. Mass. 2009).
180
Id. at 119.
181
United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009).
182
Id. at 167.
183
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C.DAVIS.L.REV. 1059 (2009). Commentators have proposed other remedies to improve
prosecutorial accountability. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L. J. 1509 (2009); Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995).
184
Apparently the stinging rebukes by the federal district judges in Stevens, Shaygan, and Jones did not go
unnoticed by the Department of Justice. On January 4, 2010, Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden
issued three memorandums to United States Attorneys, Department Prosecutors, and Heads of Department
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In sum, Imbler believed that protecting the honest prosecutor from civil liability
was the “lesser evil” than affording a civil remedy to a defendant wronged by a dishonest
prosecutor. 185 Nevertheless, the Court assured the public that it would not be unprotected
because prosecutors who abused their power would be subject to criminal prosecution
and professional discipline. Today, thirty-four years later, it is abundantly clear that
Imbler’s assurance was misguided and mistaken. Indeed, the only effective sanction –
enabling the injured party to sue the wrongdoer directly – was discarded.

V. Bad Faith Exception to Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations
The extension of Imbler to a prosecutor’s willful violation of Brady was an
unjustified extension of absolute immunity thirty-four years ago, and appears much more
unwarranted today. As I have already demonstrated, Imbler provides tenuous support for
absolute immunity for prosecutors with respect to their misconduct in general. But in
view of the widespread occurrences of Brady violations, and the lack of effective

Litigating Components providing guidance in handling criminal discovery. For Memorandum to
Department Prosecutors, see http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html. (“The guidance is
intended to establish a methodical approach to consideration of discovery obligations that prosecutors
should follow in every case to avoid lapses that can result in consequences adverse to the department’s
pursuit of justice.”) The Memorandum to Department Prosecutors specifically provides guidance to the
“prosecution team” on where to look for Brady evidence, what to review, how to conduct the evidence
review, and the scope, timing, and form of disclosures. The guidance is intended to supplement the United
States Attorneys Manual dealing with disclosure. See United States Attorneys Manual § 9-5.001. Guidance
is also provided by a designated criminal discovery coordinator in their office, as well as a full-time
discovery expert who will be detailed to Washington from the field. For Memorandum on Discovery
Policies, see http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.html. For Memorandum for Heads of Department
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sanctions to deter such misconduct, Imbler’s protection of prosecutors is even more
unjustified. Imbler’s decision to protect prosecutors not only prevents a wronged person
from redressing constitutional harms caused by dishonest prosecutors but also disserves
the judicial process by undermining its integrity and fairness.
Given that Imbler is a longstanding precedent that has been repeatedly reaffirmed
by the Court, it is unlikely that the Court will reconsider its decision to afford absolute
immunity to prosecutors with respect to their advocacy functions generally. However,
there are several compelling reasons that might persuade the Court, or Congress, to make
an exception to absolute immunity when prosecutors willfully suppress material
exculpatory evidence. Such an exception would appear to be much more acceptable today
than when Imbler was decided. For one thing, the framework of §1983 litigation has
changed dramatically since Imbler, especially with respect to the continuing need by
prosecutors for absolute immunity. As the Court observed in Burns v. Reed, 186 the
qualified immunity standard is far more protective of officials today than it was when
Imbler was decided; “[qualified immunity] provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 187 The Court since Imbler
“completely reformulated qualified immunity” 188 by replacing the common law
subjective standard with an objective standard that allows liability only where the official
violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” 189 This change was specifically designed to protect the
honest and conscientious official from the kinds of frivolous, harassing, and disruptive
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complaints that are made by disgruntled defendants, particularly as these complaints
relate to a prosecutor’s judgment calls and discretionary decisions, about which Imbler
was critically concerned. 190 Moreover, the Court has further narrowed a prosecutor’s
exposure to civil liability by foreclosing civil complaints entirely unless the defendant
was successful in obtaining a dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charges, further
undercutting the Court’s concern that prosecutors would be subjected to a constant flood
of lawsuits that would drain their energy and attention. 191
Additionally, one of the hallmarks of the Imbler jurisprudence has been an
attempt by the Court to ensure parity in the treatment of officials engaged in the same
functions. 192 Thus, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 193 the Court observed that when a
prosecutor performs investigative functions normally performed by police officials, and
as to which functions the police would enjoy only qualified immunity, “it is neither
appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not
the other.” 194 Ensuring parity also was addressed in Burns v. Reed, 195 where the Court
considered whether a prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity for giving legal advice to the
police, and concluded that “it is incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely
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immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only
qualified immunity for following that advice.” 196 And in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 197
which considered a supervisory prosecutor’s immunity for the supervision and training of
trial prosecutors, the Court emphasized the “practical anomalies” of affording a trial
prosecutor absolute immunity for his intentional misconduct, but affording supervisors
only qualified immunity for their negligence in training and supervising that
prosecutor. 198
The Court’s concern with parity would appear to apply equally to Brady
violations. Thus, it is well-established that a prosecutor’s disclosure duty extends to
evidence in the possession of the police, even if the prosecutor is unaware of that
evidence because, according to Kyles v. Whitley, 199 a prosecutor has “a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the case,
including the police.” 200 To be sure, for Brady purposes the police are considered an
“arm of the prosecutor,” 201 and as virtually every circuit has concluded, have a derivative
duty under Brady to turn over to the prosecutor potentially exculpatory evidence. 202
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Thus, if the police hide exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor, they violate their
Brady duty and are subject to civil liability under § 1983 for which violation they receive
at most only qualified immunity. 203 Thus, just as it would be incongruous to afford
prosecutors absolute immunity for engaging in investigative misconduct for which police
enjoy qualified immunity, and for giving bad advice to the police for which the police
would receive qualified immunity if they mistakenly relied on that advice, it would seem
just as incongruous to afford prosecutors absolute immunity for failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defendant but afford the police only qualified immunity for
failing to turn that same evidence over to the prosecutor.
Finally, just as the Court has created exceptions for bad faith conduct by
prosecutors that violate the constitutional rights of defendants, so too could the Court
create an exception to absolute immunity for bad faith violations of Brady. To be sure, a
violation of Brady does not require that a prosecutor act in bad faith. The Brady rule
reflects a “no-fault” principle that focuses on “the character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor.” 204 However, a bad faith exception to absolute immunity
would focus squarely on the character of the prosecutor, as well as the nature of the
evidence that was suppressed, and the harm caused by that suppression. Bad faith
conduct would consist of a conscious decision by a prosecutor to conceal from the
defendant materially favorable evidence with knowledge that this evidence would
exculpate the accused or impeach the credibility of a key witness. Unquestionably, such
bad faith conduct is unethical and dishonest. It manifests a conscious intention by a
203
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prosecutor to commit a fraud on the judicial process – to defraud the defendant of his
right to a fair trial, the court of the assurance that its discovery orders have been complied
with, and the jury of learning all of the facts that would materially assist its mission to
arrive at the truth. 205 Bad faith conduct embraces the quality of “moral turpitude” that
subjects the conduct of all attorneys to professional discipline 206
Creating an exception for bad faith conduct of prosecutors that violates
constitutional rules is hardly a novel proposal. Such an exception has been recognized by
the Court in several areas involving the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. For
example, with respect to a prosecutor’s charging function, the Supreme Court has stated
that so long as a prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused has committed
a criminal offense, the decision whether or not to prosecute rests entirely in his
discretion. 207 However, the Court has created several exceptions when a prosecutor
institutes charges in bad faith, such as selectively charging persons based on
unconstitutional standards relating to race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications, 208
vindictively charging persons in retaliation for their exercising legal rights, 209 and
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bringing charges in order to harass a defendant. 210 Further, the Court has also recognized
a bad faith exception to the rule that allows prosecutors virtually unfettered discretion in
deciding when to bring charges. 211 Thus, when a prosecutor delays bringing charges
against a defendant in order to gain a “tactical advantage” over the accused, 212 due
process may be invoked to bar prosecution. 213 Moreover, although double jeopardy does
not protect a defendant who seeks a mistrial from being retried, the Court has created an
exception to this rule in order to prevent a prosecutor from subverting a defendant’s
double jeopardy rights. 214 Thus, when a prosecutor engages in bad faith conduct for the
purpose of provoking a defendant into seeking a mistrial, the protection of double
jeopardy may be invoked to prevent the prosecutor from retrying the defendant. 215
Finally, although the government’s loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence does not by itself violate due process, the Court has created an exception for
exculpatory evidence which was lost or destroyed by the prosecution in bad faith for the
purpose of preventing its use by the defendant. 216
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A bad faith exception to absolute immunity for a prosecutor’s deliberate
suppression of exculpatory evidence is consistent with the Court’s adoption of other
exceptions for bad faith conduct by prosecutors. As noted above, the bad faith
suppression of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors is a matter of increasing concern to
courts and commentators, has contributed to the convictions of innocent persons, and is
not subject to meaningful sanctions that might deter such misconduct. A bad faith
exception would be limited to conduct by prosecutors that is deliberately undertaken to
deprive a defendant of materially favorable evidence, thereby depriving a defendant of a
fair trial. A “Brady exception” to absolute immunity would effect only a modest inroad
into the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. But such an exception would make
a significant contribution to the integrity of the judicial process, which was the rationale
for the Imbler rule in the first place, and would make prosecutors accountable for their
deliberate constitutional violations.

Conclusion
Despite being built on questionable history and speculative policy, Imbler v.
Pachtman has been the foundation for the well-established rule that affords prosecutors
absolute immunity from civil liability for conduct that is integrally related to the judicial
process. According to Imbler, and reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, the absolute
immunity extends to a prosecutor’s deliberate concealment from the defense of
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. This is so even though Imbler’s
concern that absolute immunity is necessary to protect the integrity and fairness of the
judicial process is inconsistent with affording absolute immunity for Brady violations.
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The judicial evolution of the Brady rule has made it easier for prosecutors to
violate Brady, and the lack of an effective mechanism to sanction or deter violations
invites a re-thinking of the wisdom in continuing to afford prosecutors the shield of
absolute immunity for willful and serious Brady violations. Brady violations appear to be
more common than ever, and as Justice White noted in his concurrence in Imbler, “the
stakes are high.” Brady violations deny the defendant his right to a fair trial, undermine
the integrity of the judicial process, and tarnish the public’s perception of the judicial
process.
Consistent with other instances in which the Court has made exceptions to
constitutional rules for bad faith conduct by prosecutors, this Article proposes an
exception to a prosecutor’s absolute immunity for bad faith conduct that involves the
deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. Such an exception would not interfere
with the policy reasons of Imbler. The exception would not apply to the honest and
conscientious prosecutor who seeks to comply with Brady. Indeed, it probably would not
apply to the prosecutor who has negligently overlooked or failed to appreciate the
significance of potential Brady evidence. The exception would apply only to those
prosecutors who could be proved to have suppressed evidence in bad faith intentionally
to deprive the defendant of exculpatory evidence. The exception is limited. However,
given the limited availability of other sanctions, such an exception would provide at the
very least a meaningful remedy to individuals whose constitutional rights were violated,
and who were wrongfully deprived of their liberty by a prosecutor’s unlawful conduct.

45

